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Copyright and Social Media:          
A Tale of Legislative Abdication 
 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman* 
 
Social media platforms, their users and commercial 
content providers are like the Hatfields and the McCoys: it is 
war out there, and new arenas of combat keep popping up with 
all the vigor of noxious weeds in the vegetable garden.  Just 
looking at copyright (trademarks are another subject of 
dispute, one this brief paper will not address), we see social 
media sites laying expansive claim to the copyrights of their 
users;1 the content industry trying,  through force or 
persuasion, to shift onto social media platforms (and Internet 
service providers (ISPs) generally) significant, indeed primary, 
responsibility for copyright enforcement; and commercial 
players, who have come to see social networks as valuable 
platforms for their own content, eying citizen participants not 
only as potential copyright thieves, but as competitors for 
 
*
 Samuel Tilden Professor of Law Emerita, New York University School of 
Law. 
1. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013), 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (Similarly, the terms of service for 
Facebook provide that “[f]or content that is covered by intellectual property 
rights, like photos and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the 
following permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you 
grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide 
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook 
(IP License).  This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your 
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not 
deleted it.”); Myspace Services Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (May 15, 
2014), https://myspace.com/pages/terms (Myspace’s terms of service states the 
following:  “You grant us broad rights to use and exploit Content you post or 
make available via the Myspace Services, your profile and activity 
information, and your name, persona and likeness, as more fully explained 
below. You will not be entitled to compensation or attribution even if we or 
others profit from such use. However, you remain the owner and fully 
responsible for your Content and for ensuring that its use in connection with 
the Myspace Services do not violate any third party rights or any law. Your 
right to use Myspace Content, User Content and Third Party Content is very 
limited and revocable.”). 
1
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valuable viewer eyeballs.  You will not be surprised to learn 
that the fiercest fights are duked out on behalf of big content 
providers in legislatures, courts and during trade negotiations. 
For that reason, the focus of this article will be on what I 
call DMCA 2.0.  It will begin by discussing the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)2 and why that statute, 
passed in 1998 to shore up the enforceability of copyright 
online by protecting content providers’ ability to engage in 
forms of technological self-help against online copyright 
infringers, has been problematic.  Part II describes largely 
unsuccessful efforts in the form of statutes and trade 
agreements to shore up the DMCA.  Part III turns to the latest 
salvo, the adoption of “voluntary agreements” whereby content 
owners and ISPs, in particular social media platforms, join 
forces to stem infringement.  The final section lays out the 
difficulties with the voluntary solution and suggests that 
legislators have abdicated their responsibility to maintain a 
fair balance between rights of social network users and 
commercial content providers. 
 
I. The DMCA 
 
Copyright has traditionally depended largely on voluntary 
compliance and civil litigation to maintain relative stability 
between owners and users.  This system worked well in the era 
of hard copy, where infringement tended to require 
considerable and expensive infrastructure and where the end 
product had somehow to be brought, fairly transparently, into 
the marketplace.  Once personal copying technologies such as 
photocopiers and videocassette recorders became widely 
available, infringement was harder to detect and pursue.  The 
advent of the Internet was perceived by the copyright 
industries as having put the problem of infringement beyond 
the capacity of existing copyright law to control.  The industries 
decided that they themselves needed to use technology 
proactively to limit access to protected works in electronic form 
and to control the ability of users with a computer to copy and 
 
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, §§ 1201-1204 
(2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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distribute the works at will.3  By making it illegal for users to 
hack around access controls,4 or to make and market 
technologies that would enable the public to defeat methods 
used by owners to protect their content,5 the DCMA was 
intended to make it possible for owners to prevent 
infringement without the continual intervention of the courts. 
Although the United States is still trying to convince its 
trading partners to introduce their own versions of the DMCA 
into their legal systems,6 on the home front, wide agreement 
exists that the legislation has been less than successful.  First 
of all, digital rights management technologies have been 
unpopular with the public7 and sometimes quite problematic in 
their consequences.8  They are also like caviar to hackers.9 
A further source of difficulty from the perspective of the 
content industries resides in the fact that, as a part of the same 
legislation, Congress created a number of so-called “safe 
harbor” provisions to protect ISPs against damages arising 
from content transmitted or posted on websites by other 
 
3. The self-help strategy is discussed in Diane L. Zimmerman, Living 
Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1375, 1378-81 (2007). 
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
5. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (these technologies are commonly known as 
digital rights management tools or DRMs). 
6. See Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Aug. 30, 2013, 
available at  http://wikileaks.org/tpp/ [hereinafter TPP] (exploring the 
controversy over the IP provisions in the TPP, a secretly negotiated trade 
pact, the contents of which we learned thanks to Wikileaks). 
7. See Macworld Staff, iTunes Store and DRM-Free Music: What You 
Need to Know, MACWORLD (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/1138000/drm_faq.html (a major 
breakthrough occurred when all the major record labels agreed to allow songs 
to be sold without DRMs). 
8. See Bob Brown, Sony BMG Rootkit Scandal: 5 Years Later, 
NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/110110-sonybmg-rootkit-fsecure-
drm.html (a DRM used by Sony to protect its music against copying opened a 
window in purchaser’s computers that allowed malware to infiltrate them.  It 
caused a major scandal). 
9. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub. nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (see the lower court’s decision for the facts).  (One 
of the first challenges to the DMCA, the case involved a hack to the DRM 
used to restrict access to digital video recordings.  The defendants in the case 
argued that they needed to get around the DRM to enable them to watch 
movies on computers using Linux operating systems.) 
3
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parties.10  The terms for eligibility vary with the kind of ISP, 
but all must have a publicly stated policy that allows them to 
terminate account holders and subscribers for repeated 
instances of illicit content – or as I like to think of it, copyright 
recidivism.11  All ISPs must also agree to “accommodate” 
something called standard technology measures (ones that 
allow copyright owners “to identify or protect” their intellectual 
property).12 
ISPs that do not host content, but merely transmit it, 
receive the broadest protection.13  Because peer-to-peer file 
sharing occurs on these networks, the burden of tracking down 
participants, identifying them, and suing them has fallen 
almost entirely on the content owners.  Pursuing remedies has 
proven expensive and has also resulted in truly dreadful public 
relations.  Law suits against individuals – who are likely to be 
the industry’s customer base as well – have not won friends for 
large content owners.14 
 
10. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998). (The purpose was to avoid 
underinvestment in Internet infrastructure by removing the spectre of 
secondary liability for ISPs based on the activities of their users). 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
12. Id. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
13. Id. § 512(j) (they have to find the infringer, get a subpoena to require 
the ISP to identify him or her, prove that infringement has occurred, and only 
then might a court enjoin the ISP from providing service to the individual or 
entity under). 
14. This of course does not mean owners will not sue consumers.  
Makers of the award-winning film, The Hurt Locker, sued more than 24,500 
individuals in 2011 for downloading the movie.  See Sarah Jacobsson 
Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Lawsuit Targets 24,583 BitTorrent Users, PC WORLD 
(May 24, 2011, 8:07 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/228519/Hurt_Locker_Lawsuit_Targets_24583
_BitTorrent_Users.html.  The action was terminated after an unknown 
number of settlements, only to have the plaintiffs file suit in Florida against 
2,512 more people.  See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Studio Sues 
2,514 Over Copyright Infringement, PC WORLD (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:41 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/254381/hurt_locker_sue_2_514_over_copyrigh
t_infringement.html.  More recently, the makers have sued individuals who 
allegedly downloaded the film Dallas Buyers Club.  See Ernesto Van Der Sar, 
Dallas Buyers Club Sues BitTorrent Pirates Citing Oscar Wins, 
TORRENTFREAK (Mar. 12, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/dallas-buyers-club-
sues-bittorrent-pirates-citing-oscar-wins-140312/.  ISPs that make peer-to-
peer file sharing possible have agreed to participate in something called the 
Copyright Alert program.  See What is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR 
COPYRIGHT INFO., http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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For those ISPs that host user content – and that includes 
social media sites – and for search engines, the system works 
somewhat differently.  Such ISPs, upon receipt of a proper 
notice from the content owners of a specific instance of 
infringing content posted on the site, must act promptly to take 
it down.15  The notice and takedown process has turned out to 
be expensive for both sides: just to give one example, Google 
receives, and must act on, in excess of 6 million take-down 
notices a week.16  Also, material taken down in one place 
frequently pops up in another, creating what is generally 
referred to as the “Whack-a-Mole” problem – a need to send 
notices over and over about the same content.17 
Absent a properly drafted takedown notice, ISPs subject to 
that scheme pretty much have to be hit over the head with 
evidence that a user has posted a specific infringing work for 
the ISP to have any independent duty to take down infringing 
content.  The statute does contain what is called a “red flag” 
provision that says the ISP must act on its own if it has actual 
knowledge of the presence of infringing content, or is aware of 
“facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.”18  Plaintiffs, including most notably Viacom, spent 
years trying to convince courts to adopt theories that would 
deprive ISPs of their statutory immunity, including the 
argument that an ISP with general awareness of the presence 
(indeed prevalence) of infringing content on its site has met the 
“red flag” test and must proactively remove it.  The push by 
Viacom finally faltered, and its suit against YouTube settled, 
 
system/what-is-a-copyright-alert/http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-
copyright-alert-system/what-is-a-copyright-alert/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).  
For more information about Copyright Alert, see infra notes 45-47 and 
accompanying text. 
15. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3) (search engines are required to disable access 
to infringing content upon receipt of notice). 
16. Since 2011, Google has received almost 24 million takedown 
requests.  Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE (Mar. 25, 2014), 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright. 
17. See Whac-a-Mole, WIKIPEDIA (Jan 8, 2015), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whac-a-Mole. Whac-a-mole is a popular game.  
But in colloquial use, the term Whack-a-Mole refers to “a repetitious and 
futile task . . . . [I]n computing and networking . . . , it refers to the process of 
fending off recurring spammers, vandals or miscreants.” Id. 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
5
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after the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant for a second time.19  Given the structure and purpose 
of Section 512, judges have been – correctly, I would assert – 
reluctant to force ISPs, including social network platforms, to 
take over a greater part of the burden of enforcing copyright. 
On the other hand, as already noted, if an ISP receives 
repeated notices that the same user has posted infringing 
material, it is obligated under the statute at some point to 
terminate the subscriber.20  This provision is increasingly seen 
as problematic.  Obviously, ISPs are not anxious to cut off their 
paying customers.  But more importantly, because so much of 
our communicatory lives now take place on the Internet, 
disabling the ability of individuals to use e-mail, conduct 
searches, and post or access content raises serious free speech 
concerns.  Anyone who has experienced a loss of Internet 
service as a result of storm damage or technical difficulties 
knows well how difficult both work and social communication 
can be for the subscriber and for the people who expect to be 
able to reach him or her at an  e-mail address.  The experience 
in France offers an example that makes this point.  The French 
legislature passed a statute, called the HADOPI law, after the 
entity created to administer it, that required ISPs to cut users 
who infringed for the third time off of the Internet.21  The law 
 
19. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court was asked to 
determine, among other things, whether the evidence showed that YouTube 
had knowledge of specific infringing materials, had “willfully blinded” itself to 
specific infringements, or had a “right and ability to control” infringing 
activity within the meaning of section 512. Id.  The court concluded that 
Viacom could not prove knowledge, and that failure to search for infringing 
material based on a general awareness of its existence did not constitute 
“willful blindness.”  Id. at 115-17.  As for the “right and ability to control,” the 
court concluded that mere “knowledge of the prevalence of infringing activity, 
and welcoming it, does not itself forfeit the safe harbor.  To forfeit, the 
provider must influence or participate in the infringement.”  Id. at 118. 
20. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
21. HADOPI stands for the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des 
Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet.  See Hadopi, HADOPI (2012), 
http://www.hadopi.fr/en. For original title and text of law, see Lois 2009-1311 
du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la propriété littéraire et 
artistique sur internet [Law 2009-1311 of October 28, 2009 Relating to Penal 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property on the Internet], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE  [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 
29, 2009, at 183. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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cost millions to administer22 and reportedly resulted in one 
court ordering one 15 day suspension of service.23  After a year 
of this, the cut-off provision was repealed.24 
 
II. More Statutes?  More Treaties? 
 
What to do?  The United States, which has been 
particularly concerned about protecting its major content 
providers, especially the music and motion picture industries, 
tried two approaches: first, to pass more domestic statutes that 
add even more stringent enforcement tools; second, to 
champion trade agreements which, once ratified, would 
mandate Congress to make the desired statutory changes (and 
would bring other countries into closer conformity with U.S. 
law). 
Neither approach turned out to be easy.  Congress first 
tried to pass a statute that would have required ISPs to cut off 
access to sites that harbored infringing content.25  After 
 
22. Siraj Datoo, France Drops Controversial ‘Hadopi Law’ After 
Spending Millions, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2013, 11:09 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/09/france-hadopi-law-anti-
piracy.  One source said that the actual figure was €12 million.  See Hadopi 
“Failure” a Warning for the UK?, 1709 BLOG (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2012/08/hadopi-failure-warning-for-uk.html.   
See also Enigmax, Three Strikes Anti-Piracy Budget “Too Expensive to 
Justify” Says Minister (Aug. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/three-strikes-
anti-piracy-budget-too-expensive-to-justify-says-minister-120603/(attributing 
that figure to The French Minister of Culture and Communication Aurélie 
Filippetti).  See generally Christophe Geiger, Challenges for the Enforcement 
of Copyright in the Online World: Time for a New Approach (Max Planck Inst. 
for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 14-01, 2014) forthcoming 
EDWARD ELGAR, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (P. Torremans eds.) (2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2382603 (discussing the 
graduated response approach and HADOPI in particular). 
23. Datoo, supra note 22.  
24. Publication of the Decree Removing the Additional Penalty of 
Suspension of Access to the Internet, CULTURE COMMC’N (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:30), 
http://translate.google.com.au/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UT
F&u=http://www.culturecommunication.gouv.fr/Espace-
Presse/Communiques/Publication-du-decret-supprimant-la-peine-
complementaire-de-la-suspension-d-acces-a-Internet. 
25. The bills were entitled the Stop Online Piracy Act and Preventing 
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act of 2011.  H.R. 3621, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Stop Online 
7
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massive protests by the public and by the Internet 
community,26 Congress dropped the attempt to enact the Stop 
Online Piracy Act or SOPA and its Senate analog, the Protect 
IP Act or PIPA.27  There have also been efforts to export the 
DMCA or substantially similar legislation (whatever its 
drawbacks), and those have not fared well either.  As already 
noted, France’s three strikes notice-and-take-down scheme has 
been scaled back decisively.28  The Trans-pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP),29 a secretly negotiated document that would 
require its participants to adopt DMCA-like legislation, has 
failed thus far to reach completion, partly because of resistance 
by several countries to the intellectual property provisions,30 
and a growing public outcry.31 
A second, secretly negotiated, treaty that would require 
expanded enforcement powers, including provisions similar to 
those in the defeated SOPA and PIPA, has failed thus far to 
gain traction as well.32  The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
 
Piracy Act]; S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
26. David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Websites, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-
to-shut-down-web-sites/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html. 
27. See Timothy B. Lee, Internet Wins: SOPA and PIPA Both Shelved, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/01/internet-wins-sopa-and-pipa-both-shelved/. 
28. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.  A recent study found 
that HADOPI actually was not an effective deterrent to illegal downloading.  
Michael A. Arnold et al., Graduated Response Policy and the Behavior of 
Digital Pirates: Evidence from the French Three-Strike (Hadopi) Law, (Univ. 
of DE, Alfred Lerner Coll. of Bus. & Econ., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 
2014-07, 2014). 
29. The text of the intellectual property part of the draft was made 
available by Wikileaks in November 2013.  See TPP, supra note 6. 
30. The line-up on various provisions of the draft is indicated in the copy 
released by Wikileaks.  Id.; see also Maira Sutton, Obama Nominates Former 
SOPA Lobbyist to Help Lead TPP Negotiations, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 
3, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/obama-nominates-former-
sopa-lobbyist-help-lead-tpp-negotiations (discussing the problems dogging the 
treaty). 
31. Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 176 Million Workers Call to 
Stop TPP Negotiations, EYES ON TRADE (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2014/11/176-million-workers-stop-the-
TPP.html. 
32. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 
5, 2013), https://www.eff.org/issues/acta (describing the negotiating process). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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Agreement, or ACTA,33 goes well beyond the TPP to require 
enforcement measures that would provide “expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringement and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringement,”34 as well as 
criminal sanctions for infringement on “a commercial scale.”35  
Onerous civil damage provisions would also be required.36  
Although what is meant by “expeditious remedies” has not 
been spelled out, the provision has been widely interpreted as 
an invitation to its signatories to require ISPs to engage in both 
website blocking and deep packet filtering.  And because 
“commercial scale” is not defined, criminal sanctions could well 
apply to informal peer-to-peer networks involving no profit-
making activity.  Furthermore, the treaty calls for a committee 
to be formed of members appointed from signatory countries to 
oversee implementation of the treaty.37 
ACTA stalled out when the European Parliament refused 
to ratify it by a vote of 478 against to 39 in favor.38  Objections 
included interference with data privacy and with freedom of 
speech and communication.  As with SOPA and PIPA, 
extensive public protests seem to have played a role in the 
result.39 
But content owners do not give up easily.  If legislation and 
 
33. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 
243-57 [hereinafter ACTA], available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. 
34. Id. art. 27, ¶ 1. 
35. Id. art. 23, ¶ 1. 
36. A plaintiff is allowed to collect “the value of the infringed goods or 
services measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.” Id. art. 
9, ¶ 1.  A similar provision can be found in the draft of the TPP.  See TPP, 
supra note 6, at QQ.H.4(2ter); see also Lee, supra note 27. 
37. ACTA, supra note 33, ch. V. 
38. David Meyer, ACTA Rejected by Europe, Leaving Copyright Treaty 
Near Dead, ZDNET (July 4, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/acta-rejected-by-
europe-leaving-copyright-treaty-near-dead-7000000255/.  The treaty could 
nevertheless become effective in other signatory countries if ratified by six of 
them.  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
39. Eric Kirschbaum & Inna Ivanova, Protests Erupt Across Europe 
Against Web Piracy Treaty, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/11/us-europe-protest-acta-
idUSTRE81A0I120120211. 
9
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treaties are a tough sell, why not try to achieve the same ends 
by means of private agreements?  But why, you might ask, 
would ISPs agree to take on responsibilities that the law seems 
unwilling or unable to impose on them?  One can only guess at 
the reasons, but an obvious suspect is the prospect of costly 
litigation – particularly when platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter operate across borders and are subject to a variety of 
potentially inconsistent national laws.40  And then there is that 
oldie but goodie, the governmental “raised eyebrow.”  By that, I 
mean explicit official encouragement of private agreements, 
backed by an implicit threat to enact more legislation if 
“voluntary” efforts do not satisfy the content owners’ needs. 
The proverbial eyebrow has been raised in the United 
States by several members of Congress who lauded voluntary 
agreements during hearings about the problem of piracy.41  
Similar sentiments appear in a report by the Department of 
Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force.42  ACTA, too, expressly 
 
40. For example, in 2012, a German court found YouTube liable for 
infringing material posted by its users under circumstances that would likely 
have not resulted in liability in the United States in light of its expansive 
safe harbor provisions protecting hosting websites. Landgericht Hamburg 
[LG Hamburg] [Hamburg Regional Court] Apr. 20, 2012 (Ger.). An English 
translation of the case is available at 
http://gmriccio.wordpress.com/2012/04/29/hamburg-district-court-gema-v-
youtube-english-translation/.  As of late 2014, the litigants still had not 
reached a settlement on the royalties Google, which owns YouTube, now owes 
to GEMA. Philip Stade. “This Video Is Not Available in Germany:” Online 
Discourses on the German Collecting Society GEMA and YouTube, 19 FIRST 
MONDAY 10 (2014), available at 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5548/4127.  GEMA has 
sought review before the Arbitration Board of the German Patent and 
Trademark Office.  Id. 
41. For example, Rep. Howard Coble, Chair of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, is quoted as 
saying:  “[P]rivate sector actions are oftentimes more efficient and effective 
than some regulations handed down by the federal government.”  Tamlin H. 
Bason, Copyrights/Hearings: House Subcommittee Examines Role of Industry 
Agreements in Curbing Online Piracy, 86 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 
(BNA) 2130 (2013). 
42. A report states: “In the search for appropriate solutions, it is 
important to note that legislation may not be the sole or the best avenue 
available.  Indeed, no single solution is likely to be enough; a combination of 
approaches will be needed to create an environment that can sustain a 
thriving market for legitimate content.  Voluntary initiatives and best 
practices, including those involving cooperation among right holders and 
intermediaries, offer great promise and continue to be supported as an 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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encourages the use of “cooperative efforts” within the business 
community as a way to solve infringement problems.43  All of 
this praise for private solutions is worth paying attention to 
because, as it turns out, the voluntary solution approach is the 
current poster child for digital copyright reform.  Forget trying 
to address the problem through carefully thought–out 
legislation that attends to and attempts to balance the rights of 
both owners and of the public; instead, encourage the content 
industry and the ISPs to create a copyright enforcement system 
that works for them – and hope the public interest does not get 
lost in the process.  The invitation has been accepted and new 
extra-legal schemes have emerged quite rapidly. 
Two major results of the turn toward private agreements 
have been the Copyright Alert System and the Content ID 
system.44  The Copyright Alert System is a so-called “graduated 
response” protocol for dealing with infringements that take 
place largely on peer-to-peer networks for which the ISP acts 
as a pipeline rather than as a hosting entity.45  It calls for an 
escalating series of warnings sent to the holders of the relevant 
IP addresses, culminating by the sixth in some form of 
“mitigation” measure to be determined, apparently, by the 
ISP.46  Notably absent in the discussion of sanctions is any talk 
of the unpopular remedy of cutting subscribers off of the 
Internet.47 
 
approach by the Administration.” INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 41 (2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpape
r.pdf. 
43. ACTA, supra note 33, art. 27, ¶ 3. 
44. Other attempts have aimed at stopping pirate sites from sharing in 
search engine advertising revenue, and provided for a Payment Processor 
Program aimed at making it harder for purchasers to pay for counterfeit 
items.  See  Stop Online Piracy Act, supra note 25, § 102(c)(2)(C) & (D). 
45. What is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (2014), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/what-is-a-
copyright-alert/ (the system is operated by the Center for Copyright 
Information, an industry consortium). 
46. Daniel Nazer, The Copyright Alert System FAQ, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/six-strikes-
copyright-alert-system-faq. 
47. Resources and FAQ, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. (2014), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/resources-faq/copyright-alert-system-
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The agreement that has the most impressive teeth, 
however, is the one that applies to social network platforms.  A 
substantial number of such platforms are now filtering the 
content users’ attempts to post, looking for copyrighted work 
and either keeping it from loading or flagging it in some way as 
illicit.48  The best known example is YouTube’s Content ID 
program, and thus it will serve as a model for the present 
discussion. The Content ID approach can be thought of as the 
privatized nuclear option. 
How do Content ID and its siblings work?  First, content 
owners must assemble their content files and make, or have a 
third party service create, a database of so-called digital 
fingerprints from the originals.  Whenever a user tries to 
upload a file, an automated program looks to see if there are 
matches between the database and the content the user is 
trying to post.49  What happens next depends on the platform 
and the wishes of the content owner. 
If a match is found in a submission to YouTube, its 
Content ID tool offers the owner three options.  It can choose to 
have the content blocked, and if the block is worldwide, that 
fact will result in the user’s account not being in good standing.  
This can bar the account holder from using certain standard 
parts of the system such as YouTube Live or from uploading 
certain kinds of videos.50  While it is clear that three copyright 
strikes entered as a result of DMCA takedown notices can lead 
to the termination of the user’s account,51 the effect of multiple 
worldwide blocks, beyond what has already been mentioned, is 
left unstated. 
 
faqs/. 
48. See How Do I Remove a Copyright Block?, MYSPACE, 
https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202085854-Remove-A-Copyright-
Block (last visited Dec. 16, 2014) (Myspace uses what it calls a copyright 
filter). 
49. A Guide to YouTube Removals: So My Video Was Removed from 
YouTube…What Do I Need to Know?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (2014), 
https://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals. 
50. Keep Your YouTube Account in Good Standing, YOUTUBE, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797387?hl=en (last visited Dec. 
16, 2014). 
51. Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000?hl=en (last visited Dec. 
16, 2014). 
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Alternatively, the copyright claimant can allow the content 
to be posted, and keep track of its viewership.52  Or, it can 
allow the content to upload to the user’s account, and 
“monetize” it.  This means that any advertising revenue that 
might be generated in conjunction with the content would be 
split between Google and the copyright claimant rather than 
between Google and the party posting it.53  Recognizing that 
mistakes will occur with an automated system, Content ID 
provides YouTube users with a dispute process that can get the 
blocked material up on the user’s page.54  And in 2012, an 
appeals process was added as well.55  If the copyright claimant, 
upon being notified that the user is disputing the block, 
continues to view the material as infringing, the user can 
appeal.  The “judicial body” that decides the appeal, however, is 
hardly neutral: it is also the putative content owner.  An 
uploader who loses an appeal can expect to have the content 
removed pursuant to a DMCA notice and takedown procedure, 
which can (if several strikes are accrued) lead to suspension of 
the user’s account.56  Furthermore, the uploader who 
unsuccessfully appeals may also find him or herself subject to a 
copyright infringement suit.57 
In summary, instead of relying on the notice and takedown 
system, the ex post remedy stipulated by the DMCA, YouTube 
now allows content owners to engage in a priori control of what 
can appear on the site.  It is a practice that looks awfully much 
like a prior restraint except that it escapes Constitutional 
scrutiny because it is engaged in by private parties.  Clearly, 
 
52. How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Dec. 
16, 2014). 
53. Id. (users who post videos can join YouTube’s Partners Program, 
which entitles them to share in ad revenue). 
54. Dispute a Content ID Claim, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/content-id-disputes.html (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2014). 
55. Disputing Copyright Notifications, FAIR USE TUBE.ORG, 
http://fairusetube.org/guide-to-youtube-removals/4-disputing-copyright-
notifications (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
56. Dispute a Content ID claim, YOUTUBE, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2770411?hl=enhttps://support.goo
gle.com/youtube/answer/2770411?hl=en (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
57. Id. 
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the process is advantageous to the content owner because 
automated prescreening and blocking is less costly than 
reliance on the DMCA.  Content owners do not have to send out 
thousands of DMCA notices and risk the possibility that a 
court will find the form of the notice inadequate and hence 
unenforceable.58  And they avoid the Whack-a-Mole problem; 
prescreening means that repeated efforts to post putatively 
infringing content on YouTube will simply fail. 
Google, the owner of YouTube, likes Content ID because it 
reduces the threat of suit by content owners59 and poses less of 
a possibility that YouTube will face the need to cut off access to 
valuable customers.  Furthermore, its advertising revenue is 
protected because, when an owner chooses to monetize 
uploaded content rather than block it, a percentage of any 
advertising income the poster was generating continues to flow, 
unaffected, to YouTube.  Finally, as YouTube becomes a 
platform for more and more commercially produced content, 
offering protection to content providers in the form of Content 
ID is likely to increase the willingness of providers to use the 
platform – clearly an added monetary benefit to YouTube.60 
Admittedly, the system only works for owners who can 
afford to participate in creating the necessary digital 
fingerprints.  Furthermore, it lacks transparency and is 
uninhibited by the notions of due process that a legally 
imposed system would need to require: which is to say, you are 
presumed guilty of infringement and your defenses are 
adjudicated by your opponent.  And, of course, because the 
filtering is automatic, it is prone to significant errors.  It 
regularly identifies as infringing the content that does not 
belong to the claimant.  For one thing, content owners can be 
 
58. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 
2d 1099, 1109-10 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d sub. nom.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (presenting a 
list of artists rather than a list of works does not comply with the statute’s 
notice provisions). 
59. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
2012) (suit seeking $1 billion in damages on the ground that YouTube’s 
general awareness of the presence of infringing material on the site deprived 
it of the protections of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions). 
60. Leslie Kaufman, Viacom and YouTube Settle Suit Over Copyright 
Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2014, at B4 (stating that the terms of the 
settlement were not revealed). 
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remarkably generous to themselves in claiming ownership of 
content, and for another, because algorithms are unable to 
exercise judgment, infringement claims often involve materials 
that are protected under the doctrine of fair use.61 
This problem has long existed under the DMCA as well.  In 
a submission made several years ago in response to a new 
provision of New Zealand copyright law62 and the draft Code of 
Practice intended to implement it, Google cited a study of the 
DMCA takedown notices it received.  More than half were filed 
against businesses by competitors and thirty-seven percent did 
not state valid copyright claims.63 Google currently claims that 
at least three percent of the notices it receives each week are 
facially invalid.64  Many takedown notices involve clear 
instances of fair use.  Perhaps the most famous is the Lenz 
case, where a video clip of a baby dancing to a copyrighted 
recording became the subject of a widely-reported lawsuit.65  
The trial court ultimately concluded that a copyright claimant 
should not send a take-down notice without first conducting 
some investigation into whether the use was fair so that when 
the notice is sent, the complainant will be acting in good faith.66  
One of the most prominent opponents of “excessive” copyright 
protection, Larry Lessig, recently posted one of his lectures on 
YouTube.  Because it contained snippets of copyrighted music – 
 
61. The fair use doctrine permits people to use copyrighted content 
under certain circumstances without the permission of the owner.  The 
statute sets out a series of tests for determining whether or not an unlicensed 
use is “fair.”  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
62. New Zealand Copyright Act 1994, § 92A (repealed Sept. 11, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1994/0143/latest/DLM3288800.html. 
63. Carolyn Dalton & Antoine Aubert, Internet Service Provider 
Copyright Code of Practice - TCF Consultation Draft, GOOGLE, 9 n.3 (March 6, 
2009), http://www.tcf.org.nz/content/ebc0a1f5-6c04-48e5-9215-
ef96d06898c0.cmr. 
64. Parker Higgins & Kurt Opsahl, Top 10 Takedowns in Google’s 
Copyright Transparency Report, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2012), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/top-10-takedowns-googles-copyright-
transparency-report (this figure does not take into consideration such 
justified practices as fair use). 
65. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9799 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
66. Id. at *6 (ultimately applying a subjective standard rather than 
objective good faith). 
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pretty clearly fair use – the Internet was abuzz when he was 
subjected to a takedown notice.67  And, as the Google 
submission shows, for some, the DMCA provides an 
opportunity to exercise censorship over the speech of 
competitors and critics. 68 
It is not surprising, then, that similar problems would 
occur with systems like Content ID.  Examples abound.  When 
Michelle Obama addressed the Democratic National 
Convention in 2012, a notice was posted at the end of the 
YouTube feed of her speech that the feed was in violation of 
copyright.  Apparently, the automated filtering system read the 
clip as using music illegally, even though the convention had 
actually licensed the music and was in violation of no other 
copyright.69 
Another embarrassing example of automated overkill 
occurred that same year.  When the Mars Rover landed, NASA 
fed the footage live to the public via YouTube, or shall we say it 
tried to do so.  Scripps News shut down the feed because the 
material it used to check for infringing uploads contained 
standard NASA footage that Scripps had included in its own 
broadcasts.  Hours passed before the feed could be restored.70 
The problems with filtering have affected commercial 
content producers as well.  Recently, the video maker, 
 
67. Lawrence Lessig Settles Fair Use Lawsuit Over Phoenix Music 
Snippets, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/lawrence-lessig-settles-fair-use-lawsuit-
over-phoenix-music-snippets (the settlement required the music company to 
pay Lessig for the harm they caused him and to develop new policies that 
take fair use into account). 
68. Tamlin H. Bason, House IP Subcommittee Turns Attention to 
DMCA’s Notice and Takedown Provisions, 87 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 
J. (BNA) 1140 (2014) (the general counsel for a company that operates an 
important blogging platform reports that the number of censorship-based 
copyright notices his company receives has been rising steadily). 
69. Will Oremus, Did YouTube Really Block Michelle Obama’s DNC 
Speech for Copyright Infringement?, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2012, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/09/05/michelle_obama_dnc_spe
ech_why_did_youtube_flag_it_for_copyright_infringement_.html. 
70. Alex Pasternack, NASA’s Mars Rover Crashed Into a DMCA 
Takedown, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:49 AM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-dmca-
takedown (although the title suggests that the shutdown was a result of the 
notice-and-takedown process, the article is clear that the interruption was a 
result of a misapplication of Content ID). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/9
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WatchMojo, had its YouTube channel shut down for 21 hours 
when what it claims was a clear fair use was tagged as a 
copyright violation.71  WatchMojo claimed that the interruption 
was not only unwarranted but that it caused the company to 
lose about $3,000 in advertising revenue.72  Ironically, 
WatchMojo licenses its content to many of the same companies 
involved in shutting it down and it also helps publicize those 
producers’ content.73 
More recently, the online gaming world has been up in 
arms because Content ID has begun filtering game-related 
material for possible infringement.74  Because this sort of 
content may critique the design of computer games or help 
players better understand the games, use of some copyrighted 
content is almost inevitable.  Those who produce this material 
often earn a living from the advertising that accompanies their 
posts, but a decision by a claimant to “monetize” supposedly 
infringing content means that the poster’s share now goes to 
the game producers.75  The creators of the game-related content 
argue that what they do is just fair use, and furthermore is 
generally welcomed by game designers.76  The frequency with 
which claimants monetize rather than block this content 
suggests that some truth exists in the claim that these 
derivative works are valuable to the games’ designers. 
The examples I have used thus far come from YouTube, 
but other social networks, such as MySpace also engage in 
similar kinds of filtering.77  Although some believe that only 
well-heeled, high-volume sites can afford a version of Content 
 
71. Joshua Cohen, Top 50 YouTube Channel Terminated, Casualty of 
Content ID, TUBEFILTER (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.tubefilter.com/2013/12/15/youtube-channel-terminated-copyright-
content-id/. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Paul Tassi, The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID Crackdown 
Reveals Google’s Dark Side, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/12/19/the-injustice-of-the-
youtube-content-id-crackdown-reveals-googles-dark-side/. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Nicholas Deleon, Myspace to Implement Copyrighted Video Filtering, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 12, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/02/12/myspace-to-
implement-copyrighted-video-filtering/. 
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ID, at least some smaller sites are actually adopting it as well, 
and with it, the same set of problems.  Ustream, a video site, 
was showing the Hugo Awards for science fiction in 2012 when 
the feed was halted in midstream.78  The apparent problem?  
Neal Gaiman was receiving an award for the script he wrote for 
a television show.  Prior to giving him the award, some clips 
from the show were shown.  The automated filter registered 
them as infringing – despite the fact that the studio itself had 
supplied the clips to the Hugo Award organizers.79 
What is the proper response to all of this?  Clearly an 
awful lot of infringing activity takes place on the Internet, and 
content providers claim that the losses they incur are serious 
enough to act as a disincentive to the creation of new works.  
From that point of view, one might say, “Okay, the pre-
screening process is not perfect but it is the cheapest, most 
efficient way to solve a serious economic problem.”  But I would 
argue that answer is simply wrong. 
Filtering does serve the interests of major players in the 
copyright industries,80 but it does so by running roughshod over 
the rights and interests of other participants in the social 
networks involved.  In addition to any implications it may have 
for personal privacy, filtering poses serious challenges to free 
speech and to one of copyright’s central speech protections, fair 
use.81  Frequent statements are made about the need, in 
 
78. Zachary Knight, Copyright Enforcement Bots Seek and Destroy Hugo 
Awards, TECHDIRT (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:11 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120903/18505820259/copyright-
enforcement-bots-seek-destroy-hugo-awards.shtml. 
79. Id. 
80. The system largely serves major content providers because 
participation is cost effective for them.  It is more difficult for small players, 
especially ones like photographers with numerous works to their credit, to be 
able to afford to have the necessary digital fingerprints made of their work 
that would enable them to participate in programs like Content ID. 
81. For useful critiques of mandatory filtering, see Lilian Edwards, Role 
and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and 
Related Rights, WIPO (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibilit
y_of_the_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf; Mehan Jayasuriya et al., Forcing 
the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering is Not a Viable Solution for 
U.S. ISPs, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-filtering-whitepaper-200907.pdf; 
Network Filtering: Limiting Cultural Industries, Damaging the Internet, 
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searching for solutions to infringement, also to honor copyright 
norms.82  But automated filtering would simply be incapable of 
maintaining copyright law’s carefully-calibrated balance 
between users’ and owners’ rights.  (And no one, I would bet, is 
interested in making the investment that would be necessary 
to have humans check on the validity of an automated match.) 
That routine, mandatory filtering is fatally-flawed was 
certainly the conclusion of the European Parliament when it 
rejected ACTA.83  During consideration of the treaty, note was 
made of the fact that, earlier in the same year, the European 
Union Court of Justice in two cases, Sabam v. Netlog (a social 
network case)84 and Scarlet v. Sabam (a peer-to-peer file 
sharing case),85 ruled that requiring across-the-board 
preventative filtering by ISPs neither offered sufficient 
protection to personal privacy86 nor struck a fair balance 
between the interests of copyright owners and users.  The court 
was concerned that the costs imposed by a filtering 
requirement for all ISPs could interfere with provision of 
 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (2007), 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/effeurope/NetworkFiltering.pdf. 
82. For example, the draft of the TPP chapter on intellectual property 
states in its Objectives, Art. QQ.A.1, that one objective of the treaty is to 
“maintain a balance between the rights of intellectual property holders and 
the legitimate interests of users and the community in subject matter 
protected by intellectual property.” TPP, supra note 6. See also 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(c)(1) (2012) (“nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under 
this title”). 
83. The European Parliament was also deeply concerned over the 
application of criminal sanctions for commercial activity, a term that was so 
loosely defined that it could well be understood to reach an individual who 
downloaded a song, rather than buying it.  Geiger, supra note 22, at 12-13. 
84. Case C-360/10, Sabam v. Netlog NV (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=387762. 
85. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Sabam (Nov. 24, 2011), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=387828. 
86. Clearly, Europe is more concerned than is the United States with 
data privacy and the likelihood that data posted on Internet sites by 
individuals would be routinely harvested played a large role in its refusal to 
ratify.  One cannot say the same on this side of the pond.  Humorously, the 
major Internet players have expressed horror at the spying done by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) on Internet communications, while moving 
in the same direction themselves in the interests of copyright. 
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Internet services.  But, it also emphasized that the risk of 
misidentifying material as infringing would interfere 
impermissibly with the public’s right to receive and impart 
information.87  The problem posed by automated filtering is 
particularly problematic for Europe because, unlike America, 
several nations have built in considerable latitude for private, 
noncommercial copying into their copyright laws.88 
A common response in the United States to the claim that 
filtering is harmful to freedom of speech (and indeed to the 
creation of potentially valuable new works) is to say, “The 
number of mistakes is so small that we don’t need to worry 
about them.”  In other words, the fuss outstrips reality.  As an 
empirical matter, how many mistakes are made and how 
“significant” they are is hard to evaluate with any exactitude.89  
 
87. However, in UPC Telekabel Wein GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih 
GmbH, the court modified, or refined if one prefers, its earlier holdings. C-
314/12, UPC Telekabel Wein GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 
(March, 27, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=149924&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=478368.  
The case involved access through an ISP to a site where pirated movies were 
available.  The decision agreed that an injunction can be issued requiring an 
ISP to take “all reasonable measures” — which might include filtering — to 
interfere with subscribers’ access to a website that provides illegal content 
although filtering may not specifically be ordered.  Id. ¶ 66(2).  The court 
emphasized that any measure adopted “must be strictly targeted” to avoid 
interfering with access to legal content, Id. ¶ 56, and that the reasonableness 
of the ISP’s response is to be measured in relation to the resources available 
to it and to its other “obligations and challenges.”  Id. ¶ 52. 
88. See Edwards, supra note 81, at 62. 
89. The National Research Council, in a recent report, noted that it is 
difficult to assess the losses caused by Internet copying because the 
information about loss comes from stakeholders rather than from the 
systematic analysis of hard data.  See  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COPYRIGHT 
IN THE DIGITAL ERA: BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 1-2 (Stephen A. Miller & 
William J, Raduchel eds. 2013), available at 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/copyrightpolicy/.  Google, which 
gets vast numbers of DMCA takedown notices each week, estimates that 
about three percent are unambiguously erroneous or intentionally wrong.  
Considering the number of such notices it receives, in absolute terms, this is 
an enormous amount.  And it does not take into account things like fair use.  
See Parker Higgins & Kurt Opsahl  supra note 64 and figures cited in 
accompanying text.  According to one news report, the makers of the movie 
Dallas Buyers Club asked Google to take down some 388 URLs on its search 
engine.  Among the supposedly infringing sites to which Google was not to 
link was a page on a video-on-demand service where the movie was legally 
available.  The takedown notice was considered sufficiently inaccurate so that 
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But, I would argue that a system that suppresses even 
comparatively small amounts of protected speech is worth 
worrying about, particularly in light of the fact that avoiding 
such suppression is a major objective of copyright.90  One might 
also be forgiven for asking whether the costs – to free 
communications and creativity as well as to the Internet 
businesses themselves – really bear any rational 
proportionality to the harm from Internet infringement to the 
copyright industries.  More on that subject in a moment. 
But first, a few conclusions.  I fear that what we are 
witnessing is the result of an abdication by governmental and 
legislative bodies – in particular in the United States – of a 
core responsibility to maintain a well-balanced copyright 
system.  When private parties are actively encouraged to find 
their own private solutions to problems, particularly when 
those solutions are ones that have proven too politically toxic to 
be enacted into positive law, government is in the position of 
giving the copyright industries a green light to steer right past 
(or right through) such tricky issues as fair use, freedom of 
speech and due process.  This state of affairs should give one 
pause.  In effect, the tilt toward private ordering turns 
copyright law into window dressing, capable of being evaded, 
along with all of its constitutionally-mandated protections,91 
simply by agreeing to do so.  This is not a beneficial, and 
certainly not a beneficent, solution. 
Of course, private agreements are sometimes capable of 
improving on the law by smoothing out some unnecessary 
complexities and making the statutory intent easier and 
cheaper to achieve – the licensing practices of collective rights 
 
Google declined to take down any of the listed sites.  Ernesto, “Dallas Buyers 
Club” Makers Censor Comcast on Demand, by Mistake, TORRENTFREAK, (Mar. 
2, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/movie-studio-wants-dallas-buyers-club-
140302/. 
90. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to 
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 313-15 (2004). 
91. It is widely agreed that both the fair use doctrine and the rule that 
limits copyright only to expression and not to facts or ideas are necessary 
protections that keep copyright from running afoul of the first amendment.  
See Robert Kasunic, Symposium, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright: 
Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 397, 
397 (2007). 
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societies for music provide some examples of this.92  But if 
there are no clear limits to what can be resolved privately, and 
if parties are invited to go places that seem to contravene basic 
standards of traditional copyright, what can result is a power 
grab in the name of copyright by commercial actors for their 
own benefit, with little or no thought to the costs arbitrarily 
imposed on the rest of us. 
Perhaps one might justify abdicating intellectual property 
policy-making to private parties (although I doubt it) if the 
harm to be avoided were sufficiently grievous and adequate 
legal remedies were inadequate.  Certainly, copyright owners 
and the negotiators of trade agreements assume that the harm 
is serious and the need for draconian remedies is obvious.  
Indeed, the application of statutory damages provisions to 
individual noncommercial copyists in the United States seems 
to reinforce that assumption.93 
That claim, however, is contestable.  Let us start with 
what seems to be a common sense assumption: that every 
instance of unconsented copying represents a sale lost to the 
copyright owner.  This may seem logical at first glance but, as 
it turns out, the reality of the matter is considerably more 
complex.  For example, although courts have shown no 
willingness to accept the argument that music downloading on 
peer-to-peer networks can be a fair use because it is often done 
to “sample” music,94 a recent study in Canada found that 
downloading music from peer-to-peer networks actually was 
 
92. For example, the Harry Fox Agency, which handles the compulsory 
license royalties for song makers when their music is recorded, allows the 
accounting for royalties to be made quarterly, instead of monthly.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 115(5); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN, JANE C. GINSBURG & R. ANTHONY 
REESE, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 641 (8th ed. 2011). 
93. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2431 (2012) (reinstating trial verdict of $675,000 
in statutory damages against individual who uploaded thirty copyrighted 
songs to share over a peer-to-peer network, but ordering the lower court to 
consider remittitur).  On remand, the district court judge concluded that no 
ground existed for remittitur and allowed the original damage award to 
stand.  See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, No. CV-07-11446-(RWZ), 
2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Aug 23, 2012), aff’d, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013). 
94. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-90 (7th Cir. 
2005) (downloading to sample not fair use). 
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positively correlated with increased purchases of music.95  This 
finding has been echoed by several other commentators.96 
But, a significant amount of the copyrighted material that 
is traded or otherwise used online for free causes owners no 
loss at all for other reasons.  If enforcement is directed toward 
these users, the likely result would be only marginal gains for 
copyright owners because, given a choice between paying or not 
using the work, the users would opt for the latter.  Purchase of 
a copy or a license simply would not be worth it to them.97 I 
strongly believe that this is one reason why it has been so 
difficult to pin down the extent of economic harm from 
technologies ranging from photocopying to peer-to-peer sharing 
of music files: our appetite for free fare is a lot bigger than our 
appetite for the metered kind.98  If we can get it for nothing, we 
will take it, even if we never look at or listen to it again. There 
is no doubt that it is worthwhile and fair to provide realistic 
enforcement tools to go after profit-making, large-scale 
copyists, but that doesn’t describe most of the posters whose 
work currently runs afoul of technologies like Content ID. 
Where do I come out on this?  Should the burden go back to 
legislators to solve the infringement problem, or at least to put 
limits on the kinds of agreements private actors can 
legitimately enforce?  I believe the answer is yes.  Copyright is 
too important to the public to allow interested parties to control 
the way the system works.  One might think it wholly 
uncontroversial that Congress, rather than social networks and 
commercial content producers, should set — with open and fair 
 
95. For every download, the authors found that compact disk purchases 
increased by 0.44%.  BIRGITTE ANDERSEN & MARION FRENZ, THE IMPACT OF 
MUSIC DOWNLOADS AND P-TO-P FILE-SHARING ON THE PURCHASE OF MUSIC: A 
STUDY FOR INDUSTRY CANADA, 33 (2007), available at 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-
dppi.nsf/vwapj/IndustryCanadaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf/$FILE/IndustryCan
adaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf. 
96. See id. at 8-9 for references to other studies making a similar point. 
97. See John M. Newman, Copyright Freenomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 
1446 (2013) (Newman argues that at $0.00 price point, people will typically 
“overconsume,” that is, they will hoard copies they never or rarely use); see 
also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights, and 
Claims of Harm: Insights from the Curious History of Photocopying, 61 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 55-56 (2013). 
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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input from all interested parties  — the terms that govern what 
is permissible on hosted sites.  Since the least controversial 
arena for action is regulation of commercial infringers, it 
should be possible to define the term “commercial” 
infringement in relation to the Internet carefully and then offer 
remedies, complete with checks and balances, to deal with it.  
But the case has yet to be made that every website that has 
some infringing content, and every individual who utilizes that 
content for personal, artistic, and social reasons, should be 
swept into the same net. 
To the extent that small-scale, random individual uses do 
pose an economic problem for copyright owners, truth-to-tell it 
may just be one that cannot be resolved with remedies that are 
cost-effective, proportionate to the damage caused, and fairly 
administered.  A system that presumes guilt and does not 
provide neutral arbiters in the case of disputes certainly does 
not seem to meet the test of fairness.  If we are really serious 
about protecting fair use and free speech, some form of due 
process ought to be the least we require.  Of course, that means 
that funds would have to be devoted to creating mechanisms to 
protect the users’ interests adequately, and that is likely to be 
too expensive for private and public actors.  Given the 
uncertainties about the seriousness of the harm, a system to 
combat it that costs more than the losses it is meant to prevent 
is hardly better than simply ignoring the infringement.  Even 
the maligned DMCA notice-and-takedown process might seem 
more reasonable in comparison.99 
Personally, I strongly suspect that the problem of 
noncommercial infringement on the Internet will simply prove 
too costly to solve by law and implicates interests too serious to 
be “solved” by universal automated pre-screening of hosting 
ISPs like YouTube.  What is called for is some serious 
creativity.  Perhaps, for example, some sort of surcharge on 
Internet connections, to be distributed based on an agreed-
upon system of sampling, would offer a fair solution to the 
issue of nonprofit uses.  Surcharges are commonly used to 
compensate for private copying in European copyright 
 
99. This is unlikely, however, since a system providing something 
resembling due process would be very expensive.  See supra note 22. 
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systems,100 and have been experimented with in the United 
States as well.101 
The main challenge of the Internet, however, is less to 
copyright as such (and to the authors it aims to protect) than to 
traditional business models for marketing content.  Broadcast 
television and record album sales are at risk because the 
Internet allows consumers and downstream creators (who want 
to repurpose existing materials) to consume and use these 
kinds of content in new, more congenial ways.  Because so 
much material is already out there, and out there for free (the 
reasons for this are a subject for another article), 
intermediaries in the business of distributing content cannot 
dream of recreating the pre-Internet world; they urgently need 
to learn to compete with free, either by finding other ways to 
monetize their content – advertising, for example – or by 
offering perks and services that make it worthwhile for users to 
buy the content because it is better than “free.”  This is not pie-
in-the-sky: if it were, iTunes and Netflix would not have 
become the successes they are today.  And Spotify, which 
 
100. See MARTIN KRETSCHMER, PRIVATE COPYING AND FAIR 
COMPENSATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT LEVIES IN EUROPE, A 
REPORT FOR THE UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (2011), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_1_12/wipo_ip_eco
n_ge_1_12_ref_kretschmer; see also Jőrg Reinbothe, The Private Copying, 
Levies and DRMs Against the Background of the EU Copyright Framework, 
ASSOC. OF EUROPEAN PERFORMANCE ORG. (2003),  http://www.artis-
aepo.org/usr/docs%20drms/speech%20Reinbothe-private%20copying-
levies%20and%20DRM.pdf.  A recent ruling by the European Court of 
Justice, however, throws doubt on whether, at least in Europe, copyright 
levies can be used to compensate intellectual property owners for materials 
copied from illicit sites.  Case C-435/12, ACI Adam BV v. Stichting de 
Thuiskopie (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150786&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=491416.  An 
explanation of the import of the case is also available. Press Release No. 
58/14, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Amount of the Levy 
Payable for Making Private Copies of a Protected Work May Not Take 
Unlawful Reproductions into Account (Apr. 10, 2014),  available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
04/cp140058en.pdf. 
101. Chapter 10 of the Copyright Act of 1976 allows consumers to make 
copies of music for noncommercial purposes using a digital or analog tape 
recorder without liability. 17 U.S.C. §1008 (2012).  But, royalties were 
attached instead to the sale of digital audio recording devices and the media 
used by them to make recordings.  Id. § 1004. 
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allows unlimited free access to music for people who agree to 
receiving ads with the content, could not exist.102  The success 
of sites that depend on voluntary payments from users show 
that the public has an interest it is willing to act on in making 
sure artists can afford to continue to create.103 
This future can come none too soon.  We have seen the 
present, and it is not pretty. 
 
 
102. See Spotify Features Page, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/#all-
music (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).  The website offers two options, a free one 
with advertisements and a premium one without advertisements for a fee.  
Lilian Edwards’ report to WIPO similarly points out not merely the need for 
new business models, but the success of several that have been tried.  
Edwards, supra note 81, at 67-70. 
103. See Yochai Benkler, Voluntary Payment Models, in RETHINKING 
MUSIC: A BRIEFING BOOK 27 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y at Harv. 
Univ., 2011), available at 
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Rethinking_M
usic_Voluntary_Payment_Models.pdf; Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 1390-93. 
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